The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of engagement and enlargement is under assault in the Russian Federation. The enemy is not the Russian military, nor is it an agent the Russian government controls. The enemy is the organized criminal element operating within Russia.
After the control and security of weapons of mass destruction, the biggest threat to the US national security interests within Russia today is organized crime. Just as the threat is vague, so is its impact. The results of this assault rarely impact directly on US material or personnel. Rather the attack is upon the fundamental changes in Russian society which are necessary for it to complete its transition to democracy and a free market-based economy.
One of the objectives of the US NSS is to promote democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and ensure the establishment of free, market-based economies. ' As this paper will demonstrate, these objectives are being indirectly contested by the rapid and pervasive rise of organized crime in Russia.
Scope of the Problem
The United States is not alone in this attack from criminal elements. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) held a conference in
Washington DC on September 24, 1994. This conference on Global Organized
Crime2 brought together experts in the fields of law enforcement, intelligence, economics, political science, data processing/computers, etc, for the purpose of exploring the dramatic rise in global organized crime. At this conference, Mr. James Woolsey, then Director of Central Intelligence, made the following statement.
". .. the threat from organized crime transcends traditional law enforcement concerns. While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, some governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy interests imperiled abroad. Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft and sale of nuclear material, political intimidation and corruption all constitute a poisonous brew -a mixture potentially as deadly as some of what we faced during the cold war."3 Mr. Woolsey's comments are not overstated. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is challenged by the chaos and coercion generated by organized criminal activity. Governments are destabilized to the point of being ineffective, or at worse so corrupt internally as to be a threat to even their own population. In any case, there is a direct threat to world order and civility.
In the executive summary to the CSlS report cited above, it is noted that the dimensions of global organized crime present a greater international security challenge than anything Western democracies had to cope with during the cold war. Worldwide criminal alliances are being forged in every criminal field from money laundering and currency counterfeiting to trafficking in drugs and nuclear materials. It goes on to estimate that worldwide profits from organized crime is as high as $1 trillion (trillion with a 't').
The impact of the disintegration of the Soviet Union on the world order of the 20th century is immense and even today all of the ramifications may not be entirely understood. For example in Russia, which as the center of power of the . . . USSR may arguably have been the most advanced of the soviet republics, the economic, political and cultural impact has been simply devastating. The immediate collapse of the Communist Party coupled with the decisions to 'divest' the state government of all of its collectives, factories, etc, in a rush to privatization opened the door to corruption, opportunism and crime. Anton Surikov notes in his article Crime in Russia: The International Implications; "The western Mafiosi were attracted to the Soviet Union not only by the existence of prospective partners but also by the growing disintegration of law enforcement and security struct~res.~'~ There are no immediate, instantaneous solutions. The international nature of organized crime, particularly in Eastern Europe, requires an international response. Thus, in addition to its unilateral response, the US must exercise its international leadership to craft an appropriate and effective response from all democratic countries. The United States must act to build a broad response across the elements of national power to help set the conditions for the Russian people to determine their own destiny without the tyrannical specter and intimidation of organized crime.
Oraanized Crime in the USSR -A Historical PersDective
The historical and continuing presence of organized crime in Russia may be explained by several cultural phenomena of Russian society. As Marshall Goldman notes in his article "Why is the Mafia So Dominant in R~s s i a ? "~, the historical pervasiveness of the Soviet government into its citizens' economic and political life caused it to become socially and morally acceptable to 'cheat the state'. In fact this attitude predates the Stalinist era, having its roots in the nineteenth century or possibly earlier.
In testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 10 June 1994, Mr. Stephen Handelman outlined the historical roots of the present day Russian Mafia.' Handelman testified that although a criminal society existed in Russia for hundreds of years it was only after the 191 7 revolution that many of the groups came together and formed a loose association. As a group they were referred to as "The Vorovskoi Mir" or Thieves However, in a twist of irony, the explosion of organized crime in Russia can be laid directly at the feet of Gorbachev. In his effort to rapidly transform Soviet society through instituting his peristroika reforms and glasnost, the Soviet society literally came apart at its seams in 1991. In 1987, Gorbachev announced his privatization and cooperative business initiatives. However he included significant restrictions; for example, at first, only retirees and students were permitted to participate. This purpose of the decision to phase in reform was to ease the impact of the transition on state-owned enterprises. In other words Gorbachev wanted privatization, but was unwilling to risk the collapse of the state-ownedkontrolled economy.
This strategy of restricting the move to a private economy, according to Goldman, actually spawned a surge in the influence of the Mafia. This was because of the ability for an authority (government official) to rule or interpret various aspects of the restrictions in place. The Mafia had the money necessary to assure any 'ruling' or decision usually went in its favor.14 As a result the Mafia currently has a portion of control, if not outright ownership, of much of the Russian economy. Also during this meeting they decided to send an 'emissary' to the United States to investigate commercial opportunities.22 The man they chose for this 
Analysis -The Impact on Russia
The results of the uncontrolled operation of organized crime within the former Soviet Union countries, particularly Russia, is profound. The impact is particularly important in the areas of the Russian economy and foreign investment opportunities.
Consider government statistics cited by the Russian Chamber of
Commerce that nearly 70% of all businesses report they pay protection money (ranging from 10-20% of their gross revenue) to organized crime.27 This is far more than say they pay taxes to the state. One of the problems at issue is the sharing of intelligence information which is at the heart of the success for the FBI. The CIA is very concerned with the sharing of information they collect, particularly HUMINT, with foreign countries. They are reluctant to use these sources for law enforcement purposes in a way which might result in their compromise and subsequent loss. Nonetheless, it remains important that strategic military leaders be knowledgeable about this issue. Our continuing involvement around the world will likely force strategic leaders to confront many aspects of organized crime in context of deployments abroad. In some countries, particularly those of Eastern Europe, host nation support and service organizations may have connections to organized crime. Strategic leaders must remain cautious in dealing with local contractors and perhaps even leaders of host nation governments and militaries.
Next, in considering force protection a strategic leader should never underestimate the capability or motivation of host nation organized criminal elements, particularly in areas or countries which have more established and successful organized crime histories. In sum, future deployments, particularly to areas where organized crime is well established, will be more susceptible to pilfering, or even wholesale theft of large quantities of weapons, material (such as trucks and other vehicles) and supplies. 
